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I. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION WARFARE AND INFLUENCE 
OPERATIONS
Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election of 2016 
impressed upon many Americans the significance and potential 
impact of information warfare and influence operations on the 
political fate of a nation. This paper defines information warfare and 
influence operations (IW/IO) as the deliberate use of information 
(whether true or false) by one party on an adversary to confuse, 
mislead, and ultimately to influence the choices and decisions that the 
adversary makes. 1 IW/IO is a hostile non-kinetic activity, or at least 
an activity that is conducted between two parties whose interests are 
not well-aligned. At the same time, IW/IO is not warfare in the 
Clausewitzian sense (nor in any sense presently recognized under the 
laws of war or armed conflict); it is better characterized as hostile or 
adversarial psychological manipulation. IW/IO has connotations of 
soft power (more properly, a mix of soft power and sharp power2): 
propaganda, persuasion, culture, social forces, confusion, deception. 
The patron saint of IW/IO is Sun Tzu, who wrote that, “The supreme 
art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”   
1 This description of information warfare and influence operations is taken from Herbert 
Lin and Jaclyn Kerr, “On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and 
Manipulation”, August 8, 2017, forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Cybersecurity, 2018.  
Available at SSRN: Herbert Lin & Jaclyn Kerr, On Cyber Enabled Information/Influence 
Warfare and Manipulation, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CYBERSECURITY 1, 4 (2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3015680 [https://perma.cc/R738-LZP7]. 
2 See JOSEPH S. NYE JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, x 
(2004). See also, Christopher Walker & Jessica Ludwig, The Meaning of Sharp Power: 
How Authoritarian States Project Influence, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 16, 2017), 
https://www.foreign affairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power 
[https://perma.cc/RU8E-AVP3]. 
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Regarding Russian activities in the 2016 election the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) released a report in January 
2017 stating that:3 
Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian 
messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence 
operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts 
by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, 
third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users 
or “trolls.”  
The ODNI report further noted that, “The Russians used cyber 
operations against both political parties, including hacking into 
servers used by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and 
releasing stolen data [from the DNC and senior Clinton campaign 
personnel] to WikiLeaks and other media outlets. Russia also 
collected on certain Republican party-affiliated targets, but did not 
release any Republican-related data,”4 and no evidence or fruits of 
such labors have as of yet come to public light. 
The full extent of Russia’s overt efforts as described by the ODNI 
are still unknown at this writing (and may never be fully known).5 
However, a number of aspects are known with high confidence. For 
example: 
 
● The Internet Research Agency (a Russian “troll factory”) 
exposed 126 million people to troll content through Facebook.6 
3 OFFICE OF DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ICA 2-17-01D ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND 
INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS (2017), 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. 
4 Russian Interference in The 2016 United States Election: Before the Subcomm. on Crime 
and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (statement of James 
R. Clapper, former Director of National Intelligence.)  
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-08-
17%20Clapper%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/N86P-2HJS]. 
5 It should be recognized that these “overt” efforts were covert in at least one sense—the 
Russian actors concealed their identities in conducting their activities on social media. 
6 Hearing on “Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech 
to Find Solutions” Before the United States S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Crime and Terrorism, 115th Cong. 1, 6 (2017) (written statement of Colin Stretch, General 
Counsel, Facebook), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-31-
17%20Stretch%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHN9-N824]. 
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● Twitter identified 36,746 Russian automated accounts 
tweeting election-related content as Russian-linked, 
generating 1.4 million election-related tweets, many amplified 
through liking and retweeting.7  
● Google identified about 1,100 videos with 43 hours of YouTube 
content tied to the Russian campaign, of which a few dozen 
had in excess of 5,000 views each.8 
● Prior to the 2016 U.S. election, Cambridge Analytica 
improperly received the Facebook information of up to 87 
million Facebook users, mostly in the United States.9 
According to Reuters, the former chief executive of Cambridge 
Analytica claimed that this firm had played a decisive role in 
U.S. President Donald Trump’s 2016 election victory.10 
 
Whether these effects had an impact on the outcome of the 
election is not known; although one study suggests that they may have 
been sufficient to flip the outcome from an expected Clinton victory to 
an unexpected Trump victory.11 These findings have not been 
replicated in any other study to the best of this author’s knowledge. 
7 Hearing on “Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech 
to Find Solutions” Before the United States S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Crime and Terrorism, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Sean J. Edgett, Acting General 
Counsel, Twitter).  
8 Hearing on “Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online: Working with Tech 
to Find Solutions” Before the United States S. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on 
Crime and Terrorism, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Richard Salgado, Senior Counsel, 
Law Enforcement and Information Security, Google). 
9 Mike Schroepfer, An Update on Our Plans to Restrict Data Access on Facebook, 
FACEBOOK (Apr. 4, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/restricting-data-
access/ [https://perma.cc/5VYB-SDGK]. 
10 Eric Auchard & David Ingram, Cambridge Analytica CEO Claims Influence on US 
Election, Facebook Questioned, REUTERS (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-cambridge-analytica/cambridge-analytica-
ceo-claims-influence-on-u-s-election-facebook-questioned-idUSKBN1GW1SG 
[https://perma.cc/PPY4-BE8R]. 
11 Richard Gunther, Paul A. Beck, & Erik C. Nisbet, Fake News May Have Contributed to 
Trump’s 2016 Victory (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4429952/Fake-News-May-Have-
Contributed-to-Trump-s-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6DX-SBRT]. An earlier version of 
this report was published February 15, 2018 in The Conversation. Richard Gunther, Erik C. 
Nisbet, & Paul Beck, Trump may owe his 2016 victory to ‘fake news,’ new study suggests, 
THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 15, 2018), http://theconversation.com/study-suggests-trump-
may-owe-his-2016-victory-to-fake-news-91538 [https://perma.cc/2XMY-WGEN]. 
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II. CYBER WAR, INFORMATION WARFARE, AND INFLUENCE 
OPERATIONS 
Many political commentators, Democrats and Republicans alike, 
have pointed to the Russian interference with the 2016 election as 
cyber warfare. For example, Senator Dianne Feinstein has said: “What 
we're talking about is a cataclysmic change. What we're talking about 
is the beginning of cyber warfare.”12 Similarly, former Vice President 
Dick Cheney stated:13 
Putin’s conduct . . . has to do with cyber warfare, 
cyberattack on the United States—the fact that he used 
his capabilities in the cyber area to try to influence our 
election. . . Putin and his government, his organization, 
interfere[d] in major ways with our basic fundamental 
democratic processes. In some quarters, that would be 
considered an act of war. 
The conclusion that Russian interference in the 2016 election is an 
act of cyberwar is understandable, but it is deeply misleading and even 
dangerous.14  
To the extent that Russian meddling in the 2016 election involved 
malicious cyber activities, strengthening the electoral infrastructure of 
the United States would be part of a plausible response strategy. 
Indeed, on March 22, 2018 a bipartisan group of six senators 
introduced the “Secure Elections Act,” which is intended to 
12 Open Hearing: Social Media Influence in the 2016 U.S. Election Before the S. Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 61 (2017) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, 
Member, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence). 
13 Kristine Phillips, Cheney Delivers a Statement on Russian Meddling: “It’s an ‘Act of 
War’,” WASH. POST. (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/03/28/cheney-is-the-latest-republican-to-call-russias-alleged-meddling-in-
u-s-elections-an-act-of-war/?utm_term=.4352b7aae811 [https://perma.cc/4KMU-3LS7].  
14 The very term “act of war,” let alone “act of cyberwar,” is problematic from an 
international legal standpoint, as the term “act of war” has been replaced by terms used in 
the UN Charter, namely “armed attack” and “use of force.”  The Charter does not define 
these terms with any specificity, and since the Charter was written in 1945, long before 
cyber conflict was ever imagined as an issue of international relations, it is most unclear 
how “armed attack” and “use of force” apply to cyber war.  Perhaps more importantly, how 
any nation under any particular circumstances interprets “armed attack” or “use of force” 
is first and foremost a political decision.  Different governments in different nations under 
different circumstances will interpret it differently. 
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“streamline cybersecurity information-sharing between federal 
intelligence entities and state election agencies; provide security 
clearances to state election officials;” and provide support for state 
election cybersecurity infrastructure.15 The authors of this legislation, 
and press stories around it, characterize it as a bill to improve the 
cybersecurity of the U.S. election infrastructure. 
The Secure Elections Act addresses the covert Russian cyber 
activity to which the ODNI report referred and falls within the general 
scope of what the U.S. government defines as cybersecurity, an official 
definition of which is contained in NSPD-54:16 
[P]revention of damage to, protection of, and 
restoration of computers, electronic communications 
systems, electronic communications services, wire 
communication, and electronic communication, 
including information contained therein, to ensure its 
availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
and non-repudiation. 
But the ODNI report also referred to overt Russian activities—
messaging activities that can fairly be characterized as information 
warfare and influence operations directed against the United States. 
Even if the DNC and John Podesta (and others) had maintained 
perfect cybersecurity against intrusions, the overt Russian activities to 
affect political discourse during the election would have proceeded 
unimpeded (though the absence of the email releases might have 
diminished their effectiveness). 
It is for this reason that a focus on election cybersecurity as it is 
defined by the U.S. government (and used to define responsibilities, 
authorities, budgets, and the like) is misleading and dangerous—it 
does not speak to the toxic nature of political discourse in an Internet-
enabled information environment that Russia can manipulate in ways 
that may be entirely legal. 
15 Press Release, Sen. James Lankford et al., Senators Introduce Revised Secure Elections 
Act with Burr, Warner’s Support (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://www.lankford.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-introduce-revised-secure-
elections-act-with-burr-warners-support [https://perma.cc/5RHS-MMMB]. 
16 National Security Presidential Directive 54, Cybersecurity Policy (Jan. 8, 2008), 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-54.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q45Q-HD8H]. 
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When adversaries wage cyberwar, they take advantage of design, 
implementation, or configuration flaws in the information technology 
systems and networks they target. For example, they exploit zero-day 
vulnerabilities in a system,17 they successfully guess weak passwords, 
or they enter an Internet-connected system through a port that was 
inadvertently left open. Better cybersecurity would help to reduce an 
adversary’s ability to wage cyberwar. 
By contrast, when adversaries wage cyber-enabled information 
warfare or conduct influence operations, they take advantage of the 
features that information technology systems and networks are 
designed to offer. The Russians used social media exactly as they were 
designed to be used—Facebook, for example, to direct selected 
advertisements and other content to very narrowly defined audiences 
and Twitter to exploit automated accounts to amplify selected 
messages.  
Recalling the definition of information warfare and influence 
operations above (i.e., the deliberate use of information to confuse, 
mislead, and affect the choices and decisions that the adversary 
makes), it is clear that better cybersecurity would not help reduce an 
adversary’s ability to wage information warfare or conduct influence 
operations. 
III. WHY DOES CYBER-ENABLED IW/IO WORK?
The effectiveness of cyber-enabled IW/IO depends on two distinct 
factors—characteristics of human cognition and emotion and the 
affordances granted by modern information technology. 
A. On the Psychology of IW/IO
Information warfare and influence operations have a very long 
pedigree, and effective practitioners have often exploited principles of 
17 A vulnerability is a design or implementation flaw in a system that may have been 
introduced accidentally (in which case it is usually called a “bug”) or deliberately (e.g., by 
an untrustworthy insider).  A system with a vulnerability can be penetrated by an adversary 
who knows of it. When an adversary uses a vulnerability that is unknown to others to effect 
penetration, it is termed a “zero-day” vulnerability, since the victim will have had zero days 
to repair it. 
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human cognition in their tradecraft. For example, on propaganda, 
Hitler wrote that:18 
 [I]ts purpose must be . . . to attract the attention of the 
masses and not by any means to dispense individual 
instructions to those who already have an educated 
opinion on things or who wish to form such an opinion 
on grounds of objective study -- because that is not the 
purpose of propaganda, it must appeal to the feelings of 
the public rather than to their reasoning powers . . . 
The art of propaganda consists precisely in being able 
to awaken the imagination of the public through an 
appeal to their feelings, in finding the appropriate 
psychological form that will arrest the attention and 
appeal to the hearts of the national masses . . . The 
receptive powers of the masses are very restricted, and 
their understanding is feeble . . .  
The aim of propaganda is not to try to pass judgment 
on conflicting rights, giving each its due, but exclusively 
to emphasize the right which we are asserting. 
Propaganda must not investigate the truth objectively 
and, in so far as it is favourable to the other side, 
present it according to the theoretical rules of justice; 
yet it must present only that aspect of the truth which is 
favourable to its own side.  
Today’s cognitive and social psychology formalizes what Hitler 
knew intuitively. Specifically, heuristic dual-system cognitive theory—
the same psychology that underlies the transformation of neoclassical 
economics to behavioral economics posits that human beings have 
two systems for cognitive processing—an intuitive system (often 
designated as System 1) and an analytical system (often designated as 
System 2).19 System 1 is designed to operate rapidly—the default 
18 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 155-158 (1925), 
http://www.greatwar.nl/books/meinkampf/meinkampf.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YPX-
4NNW].  
19 For a primer on System 1 and System 2 thinking, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST 
AND SLOW (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011); Richard Petty & John Cacioppo, The 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
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system of thought, it acts reflexively, and so does process all available 
information. It is thus more prone to error (also called bias).20 System 
2 operates more slowly—it is rule-based, abstract, and linked to 
language and conscious thought. Because it operates more slowly, it is 
better able to consider more of the available information, therefore, 
making it less prone to error.21 People engaging in System 1 
information processing respond more emotionally and less rationally 
or critically than System 2 information processing, but they also 
respond more quickly as well.22 
Most individuals are capable of both System 1 and System 2 
thinking.23 The important operative question to ask, therefore, is what 
kinds of circumstances drive an individual to System 1 or System 2 
thinking?24  
Substantial evidence indicates that an individual is far less critical 
of information that is favorable to his or her position than of 
information that is not favorable.25 In other words, individuals are 
more likely to engage in System 1 thinking when favorable 
information is involved.26 For example, people are well known to 
exhibit confirmation bias in their information seeking and processing 
behavior.27 They preferentially seek out information that is consistent 
                                                                                                                  
PSYCHOLOGY 123, 125 (1986) (For other variants of dual-system cognitive theory); Shelly 
Chaiken, The Heuristic Model of Persuasion, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: THE ONTARIO 
SYMPOSIUM 3-6 (Mark P. Zanna et al. eds., Psychology Press 1987); For a contrary view on 
dual-system cognitive theory, see Arie W. Kruglanski & Erik P. Thompson, Persuasion by a 
Single Route: A View from the Unimodel, PSYCHOLOGY INQUIRY, Nov. 9, 2009, at 83-84, 
88.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political 
Beliefs, 50 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 755, 755-56 (2006). 
26 Id. 
27 For example, in a meta-analysis of 91 studies, Hart et al. considered two motivations for 
how an individual might select information to consume—the desire to gain an accurate 
understanding of reality and the desire to feel validated in his or her beliefs. These two 
motivations conflict when an accurate understanding of reality does not validate one’s 
beliefs, and such a situation motivates the question of which of these motivations is more 
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with their beliefs and they are highly critical of (or ignore) information 
that contradicts their beliefs.28  
Maintenance of an individual’s social identity also has an 
important influence on his or her selection of System 1 or System 2. 
The evidence suggests that individuals tend to adopt the views of the 
peer groups that are most salient to them, even if the “objective” or 
“factual” information available to them contradicts those views.29 
Therefore, uncritical System 1 thinking is more often active in 
processing information consonant with the beliefs and attitudes of 
those groups, and critical and skeptical System 2 thinking is more 
often active in processing information that is dissonant. These effects 
(that individuals tend to accept salient group norms) are even more 
pronounced in an anonymous environment (such as that which 
characterizes much online interaction).30 
Lastly, there is evidence that emotions and motivations affect 
cognition. For example, Bodenhausen et al found that subjects who 
were angry tended to rely more heavily on simple heuristic cues 
(suggestive of System 1 thinking) than those who were not angry, 
though they were careful not to speculate on the reason for this 
                                                                                                                  
powerful.  Hart et al. concluded that both motivations drive human information-seeking 
behavior, thus moderating each other to a certain extent, but that on balance, humans do 
exhibit a tendency towards the validation of their beliefs.  William Hart et al., Feeling 
Validated Versus Being Correct: A Meta-Analysis of Selective Exposure to Information, 
135 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N. 555, 556-559 (2009). 
28 For example, in a meta-analysis of 91 studies, Hart et al considered two motivations for 
how an individual might select information to consume—the desire to gain an accurate 
understanding of reality and the desire to feel validated in his or her beliefs.  These two 
motivations conflict when an accurate understanding of reality does not validate one’s 
beliefs, and such a situation motivates the question of which of these motivations is more 
powerful.  Hart et al conclude that both motivations drive human information-seeking 
behavior, thus moderating each other to a certain extent, but that on balance, humans do 
exhibit a tendency towards the validation of their beliefs.  See William Hart et al, “Feeling 
Validated Versus Being Correct: A Meta-Analysis of Selective Exposure to Information,” 
Psychological Bulletin 135(4):555-588, 2009, http://psycnet.apa.org/record/2009-09537-
004 [https://perma.cc/PD2E-CUGB]. 
29 The classic experiments along these lines (“conformity experiments”) were performed by 
Solomon E. Asch in the early 1950’s.  See, for example, SOLOMON E. ASCH, EFFECTS OF 
GROUP PRESSURE UPON THE MODIFICATION AND DISTORTION OF JUDGMENTS, in GROUPS, 
LEADERSHIP, AND MEN 226 (Harold Guetzkow, 1951). 
30 Tom Postmes et al., Social Influence in Computer-Mediated Communication: The 
Effects of Anonymity on Group Behavior, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1243, 
1252 (2001). 
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tendency.31 Kunda and Sinclair found that individuals were more 
likely to stereotype people (a form of System 1 thinking) when that 
stereotype was consistent with their desired impression of those 
people; conversely, when the stereotype was inconsistent with their 
desired impression, individuals tended to inhibit the use of this 
stereotype.32 Goel and Vartanian found that negative emotions (such 
as those induced by the receipt of information incongruent with a 
person’s prior beliefs) can improve the ability of a person to reason 
logically, thus enabling him or her to negate or discount that 
information.33  
B. Impact of Today’s Cyber-Enabled Capabilities on IW/IO
The psychological tendencies in human beings described above 
have been present for millennia. But today’s information-age 
technologies give IW and IO practitioners capabilities that could not 
have been imagined in the wildest dreams of master propagandists 
such as Stalin and Hitler. Specifically, modern information 
technologies and the Internet provide high connectivity, low latency, 
high degrees of anonymity, customized information searches, 
insensitivity to distance and national borders, democratized access to 
publishing capabilities, and inexpensive production and consumption 
of information content. These aspects of modern information 
technologies enable foreign practitioners of IW and IO to use 
automated Twitter accounts to amplify one-sided messages, to 
communicate with large populations at low cost without 
accountability, to pay foreign trolls to masquerade as Americans, to 
tailor inflammatory and inauthentic political messages in a manner 
highly customized to narrow audiences, and to leak confidential 
emails purloined from the accounts of political parties and 
personnel.34  
31 Galen Bodenhausen et al, Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Differential Impact 
of Anger and Sadness, 24 EUR. J. OF SOC. 45, 58-59 (1994). 
32 Ziva Kunda & Lisa Sinclair, Motivated Reasoning with Stereotypes: Activation, 
Application, and Inhibition, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 12, 20-21 (1999). 
33 See Vinod Goel & Oshin Vartanian, Negative Emotions Can Attenuate the Influence of 
Beliefs on Logical Reasoning, 25 COGNITION & EMOTION 121, 127 (2011). 
34 Herbert Lin, “Cyber Assaults on Democracy’s ‘Brain-Space’ are Here to Stay”, THE 
CIPHER BRIEF (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.thecipherbrief.com/cyber-assaults-
democracys-brain-space-stay [https://perma.cc/HG9H-X22U].  
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Perhaps most importantly, information age technologies and the 
internet have increased the volume and velocity of information in the 
public sphere by orders of magnitude in the last few decades 
(remember that the World Wide Web was invented in 1995, less than 
a quarter century ago) while the natural cognitive processing 
capabilities of human beings have not changed at all. 
Faced with a deluge of information and a chaotic information 
environment, people take measures to reduce their information 
overload. System 1 information processing is ideally suited for doing 
exactly that, and adversaries conduct cyber-enabled IW/IO to push 
people into that mode of thinking—a mode that is less rational, less 
critical, and more emotionally driven.35 Applying these cognitive 
tendencies to the cultural and political climate of today, adversaries 
such as Russia seek to increase polarization and divisiveness in 
democratic nations, amplifying existing anger and resentment to the 
point where rational discourse is nearly impossible. 
To date, the mechanisms of cyber-enabled IW/IO have been 
relatively simple. What might we see in the future? 
C. Future Cyber-Enabled Capabilities for IW/IO
The future is likely to bring a new level of technological 
sophistication to the instruments of cyber-enabled IW/IO. Some of 
the possibilities include the following. 
1. Faked Documents
To date, leaked documents have for the most part been authentic. 
But it does not take much imagination to consider artfully forged 
emails that are released along with purloined emails, with content in 
these forged emails intended to mislead and/or create artificial 
scandal. These forged emails will be difficult to distinguish from 
authentic emails that are released simultaneously. 
Indeed, there is today at least one documented instance of such 
machinations. In May 2017, the Citizen’s Lab at the University of 
Toronto released a report about documents stolen from a prominent 
journalist and critic of the Russian government that were manipulated 
35 Herbert Lin & Jacyln Kerr, On Cyber-Enabled Information/Influence Warfare and 
Manipulation, OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CYBERSECURITY (forthcoming 2019). 
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and then released as a “leak” to discredit domestic and foreign critics 
of that government.36 
2. Name-matched Use of Personal Information Obtained From 
Multiple Sources
In 2018, the improper access of Facebook data by Cambridge 
Analytica made front-page headlines around the world. Although this 
incident involved the data from tens of millions of American Facebook 
users, it involves only one data source—Facebook. But there have been 
many data breaches over the past several years (e.g., Equifax, Anthem, 
the U.S. government Office of Personnel Management) that have 
resulted in the compromise of personal information. As capacious and 
detailed as Facebook is as a repository of personal information, 
adding even more information from other sources to the Facebook 
data trove can only be more worrisome. Combining information from 
multiple sources (multiple social media sources and multiple data 
brokers, for example) can result in profiles of individuals that are even 
more detailed than what was possible with Facebook data alone, and 
one can easily imagine that in the future specific individuals would be 
the recipients of specially targeted political messaging, a term that 
includes both explicit advocacy of candidates and hot-button issues 
that may affect a campaign.  
3. Exploitation of Emotional State
Near-real-time use of social media and other clues can help to 
pinpoint the moments in time when specific individuals are most 
susceptible to particular kinds of messaging. Demonstrating the 
feasibility of such targeting, a Facebook document leaked in May 2017 
suggested that Facebook was capable of identifying teenagers at 
moments when they needed a boost in confidence, such as when they 
were feeling "stressed, "a failure", "worthless," "insecure," "defeated," 
"anxious," "silly," "useless," "stupid," or "overwhelmed."37 Responding 
36 Adam Hulcoop et al, Tainted Leaks Disinformation and Phishing with a Russian Nexus, 
THE CITIZEN LAB (May 25, 2017), https://citizenlab.ca/2017/05/tainted-leaks-
disinformation-phish [https://perma.cc/ER37-R7ZL]. 
37 Sam Machkovech, Report: Facebook helped advertisers target teens who feel 
“worthless” [Updated], ARS TECHNICA (last visited May 1, 2017), 
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2017/05/facebook-helped-advertisers-
target-teens-who-feel-worthless/ [https://perma.cc/VJU5-23R2]. 
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to stories about this leaked document, Facebook only stated that it 
was not offering tools to advertisers to target teenagers in such a 
manner.38  
Given this backdrop, it is interesting to speculate on the possibility 
that an adversary might be able to target specific individuals with 
highly tailored messages at specific times of maximum emotional 
vulnerability or stress. 
4. AI-driven Chatbots Indistinguishable From Human Beings
AI-driven chatbots will be capable of engaging in realistic text-
based conversation about hot-button issues that work to intensify 
anger and resentment on a one-on-one basis. These chatbots will not 
be able successfully emulate all aspects of human communication; 
however, within the domain of a one-sided and biased political 
conversation, it will be difficult or impossible to distinguish them from 
the persons they are trying to emulate. These chatbots are likely to 
work most effectively against audiences who do not expect to be 
talking to automated agents and who welcome the messages 
spreading. 
A number of recent developments suggest the feasibility of such 
chatbots. Human-simulating chatbots designed to persuade would 
ideally demonstrate command of relevant facts and logic, sound like 
actual humans, and make emotional connections. 
● In July 2018, IBM’s AI-driven Project Debater engaged in a 
live, public debate with a human debater.39 The specific topics 
chosen for debate were not known beforehand, though they 
were selected from a known list of about 100 topics. The 
Project Debater knowledge base was a library of hundreds of 
millions of articles from numerous well-known newspapers 
and magazines.40 Given the topic, each party delivered a four-
minute opening statement, a four-minute rebuttal, and a two-
minute summary. The BBC reported that the human audience 
38 Id.  
39 Arvind Krishna, AI Learns the Art of Debate, IBM NEWSROOM: IBM RESEARCH (June 18, 
2018), http://newsroom.ibm.com/IBM-research?item=30543 [https://perma.cc/DL9A-
32K5]. 
40 IBM, IBM Project Debater FAQ, IBM RESEARCH: AI RESEARCH, 
https://www.research.ibm.com/artificial-intelligence/project-debater/faq.html 
[https://perma.cc/7DGL-6Z9Z]. 
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believed that the human debaters had better delivery and that 
the machine “offered greater substance in its arguments.”41 In 
the words of the director of IBM Research, the Project Debater 
system “absorbs massive and diverse sets of information and 
perspectives to help people build persuasive arguments and 
make well-informed decisions.”42  
● Chatbots that sound like real human beings have come a long 
way in the 50 years since the first chatbot, ELIZA, was created 
by Joseph Weizenbaum in 1966.43 In March 2016, Microsoft 
debuted the Tay chatbot, aimed at an audience of 18-24 year-
olds. Within a day, Tay had been targeted in a "coordinated 
attack by a subset of people" that induced Tay to issue a variety 
of offensive racist and genocidal tweets.44 
● Microsoft quickly took Tay offline and apologized for the 
comments, but it is a clear example of how exposure to a 
particular kind of online environment can train an artificial 
intelligence to mimic that environment. 
● Microsoft’s XiaoIce chatbot is capable of “learning” about the 
person with whom it is interacting and engaging in a natural 
conversation. Operated primarily for a Chinese audience, 
XiaoIce had 20 million users in 2015.45 Senior Microsoft 
researchers associated with XiaoIce said that the appeal of 
“social chatbots” lies not only in their ability to respond to 
users’ diverse requests, but also in being able to establish an 
emotional connection with users, the latter of which is done by 
41 Dave Lee, IBM’s Machine Argues, Pretty Convincingly, with Humans, BBC NEWS (June 
19, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-44531132 [https://perma.cc/PNW6-
Y2W2]. 
42 Arvind Krishna, AI Learns the Art of Debate, IBM NEWSROOM: IBM RESEARCH (June 18, 
2018), http://newsroom.ibm.com/IBM-research?item=30543 [https://perma.cc/4N3H-
3TC4]. 
43 Joseph Weizenbaum, ELIZA - A Computer Program for the Study of Natural Language 
Communication between Man and Machine, 9 COMM. OF THE ACM 36, 36 (1966). 
44 Sophie Kleeman, Here Are the Microsoft Twitter Bot’s Craziest Racist Rants, GIZMODO 
(March 24, 2016) https://gizmodo.com/here-are-the-microsoft-twitter-bot-s-craziest-
racist-ra-1766820160 [https://perma.cc/M3AM-N6XS]. 
45 John Markoff & Paul Mozur, For Sympathetic Ear, More Chinese Turn to Smartphone 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/science/for-
sympathetic-ear-more-chinese-turn-to-smartphone-program.html 
[https://perma.cc/YR9N-D9GV].  
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“satisfying users’ need for communication, affection, as well 
as social belonging.”46 Further, these researchers report that 
XiaoIce does in fact enable such connection for many of its 
users.  
 
Taken together, these developments suggest the eventual 
feasibility of politically persuasive chatbots that are more or less 
indistinguishable from a human being to the untrained eye—and 
“eventually” may not be very long from now. 
5. Realistic Video and Audio Forgeries
From rudimentary scam robocalls that collect people’s voices 
saying the word “yes” in order to confirm fraudulent purchases to 
sophisticated video editing programs, technology is enabling highly 
realistic forgery of speech and video (also known as deepfakes).47 
For example, Adobe’s Voco program (at this writing, still in beta 
testing and not yet on the market) has been described by one of its 
developers as Photoshop for voice.48 Where previous audio editing 
technologies are limited to audio cutting, copying, and pasting, Voco 
allows editors to add words that don’t appear in the original audio file 
in the same voice as the original narration with only about 20 minutes 
of recorded speech for analysis. Voco was demonstrated at Adobe’s 
MAX Conference in 2016. Using a voice sample from comedian 
Keegan-Michael Key to change a sample audio of him saying, “I kissed 
my dogs and my wife” to a realistic sample of him saying, “I kissed 
Jordan three times.”49 Today, Voco’s capabilities are limited in that it 
46 Heung-Yeung Shum, Xiaodong He & Di Li, From Eliza to XiaoIce: Challenges and 
Opportunities with Social Chatbots, 19 FRONTIERS OF INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC 
ENGINEERING 10, 10-13 (2018). 
47 Annalyn Kurtz Regulators Are Warning People Not to Fall for This Sneaky Phone Scam, 
FORTUNE MAGAZINE (Mar. 28, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/28/yes-scam-phone-
call/ [https://perma.cc/57UX-68KY]. 
48 Matthew Gault, After 20 Minutes of Listening, New Adobe Tool Can Make You Say 
Anything,” VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 5, 2016), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/jpgkxp/after-20-minutes-of-listening-new-
adobe-tool-can-make-you-say-anything [https://perma.cc/9H6Y-WGX9].  
49 Peter Dockrill, Adobe's New 'Photoshop For Voice' App Lets You Put Words in People's 
Mouths, SCI. ALERT (Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.sciencealert.com/adobe-s-new-
photoshop-for-voice-app-lets-you-put-words-in-people-s-mouths 
[https://perma.cc/W926-698Q]. 
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can only be used to manipulate a word or short phrase rather than a 
longer sample, which for Voco tend to sound less natural.  
WaveNet, developed by Google’s DeepMind, performs a similar 
function to that of the Voco project, but is designed to generate 
authentic-sounding speech samples of longer length. Wavenet 
depends on a neural network to generate raw audio waveforms, which 
are then linked to produce new speech. Wavenet’s generated speech 
samples have been tested in at least one instance as being more 
natural than other voice generators. Wavenet can be trained on one 
speaker’s voice to create a voice mimic, on multiple speakers’ voices to 
create a generic voice, or on classical music samples to create realistic-
sounding new music samples. Interestingly, when trained on multiple 
speakers, the program performed better at modelling a single 
speaker’s voice than when it was trained on just one voice. 50 The main 
limitation of the technology is that it cannot read a straight text input 
yet, but instead requires text that is pre-translated into computer 
readable phonetic spelling.51 
Researchers have also been able to create digital replicas of faces 
that defeat relatively sophisticated facial recognition software. At a 
security conference in 2016, computer vision specialists from the 
University of North Carolina constructed 3D facial models based on 
publicly available Facebook photos and displayed them with mobile 
VR technology to defeat five out of five popular facial recognition 
systems that were tested (KeyLemon, Mobius, TrueKey, BioID, and 
1D).52  
50 Aaron van den Oord et al., WaveNet: A Generative Model for Raw Audio, GOOGLE 
DEEPMIND (Sep. 19, 2016), https://regmedia.co.uk/2016/09/09/wavenet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/APA7-KZBE]. 
51 Devin Coldewey, Google’s WaveNet Uses Neural Nets to Generate Eerily Convincing 
Speech and Music, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 2016), 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/09/googles-wavenet-uses-neural-nets-to-generate-
eerily-convincing-speech-and-music/ [https://perma.cc/8LAY-MLK7]. 
52 Lily Hay Newman, Hackers Trick Facial-Recognition Logins with Photos from 
Facebook (What Else?), WIRED (Aug. 19, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/08/hackers-trick-facial-recognition-logins-photos-
facebook-thanks-zuck/[https://perma.cc/ES8Y-9EDV] (citing Yi Xu, True Price, Jan 
Michael Frahm, and Fabian Monrose, Virtual U: Defeating Face Liveness Detection by 
Building Virtual Models from your Public Photos (2016), 
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity16/sec16_paper_xu.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7VQA-6QYH]). 
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These advances have been combined to create realistic video 
forgeries. Researchers at Washington University used footage and 
corresponding audio of President Obama to synthesize high-quality 
video of him speaking things he never actually said with realistic lip 
and head movements.53 Researchers from the University of Erlangen-
Nuremberg, the Max-Planck Institute for Informatics, and Stanford 
University improved on these methods to create a program that allows 
an individual to “control” the expressions of the target actor being 
mimicked (the researchers used footage of a variety of 
politicians/actors) with realistic facial transfer, in real time, and with 
smooth transition between expressions.54 
In an information environment in which the authenticity of a 
video or audio “recording” cannot be verified, the prospects for 
manipulating public perceptions are concerning. In response to such 
concerns, some researchers in this field—aware of these dangers—are 
trying to find ways to mark such objects as inauthentic. For example, 
Zeyu Jin, one of the Voco developers at Adobe, indicated that they are 
also researching watermarking techniques to provide such an 
indication, noting that “As we’re getting the results much better, 
making it so people can’t distinguish between the fake and the real 
one, we’re working harder trying to make it detectable.”55 
Balakrishnan et al have shown that it is possible to detect a human 
53 Supasorn Suwajanakorn, Steven Seitz, & Ira Kemelmacher-Schilzerman, Synthesizing 
Obama: Learning Lip Sync from Audio, 36 ACM Tʀᴀɴs. Gʀᴀᴘʜ 95:1, 95:3 (July 2017) 
http://grail.cs.washington.edu/projects/AudioToObama/siggraph17_obama.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/297F-EEEE]; An independently produced deepfake video of President 
Obama can be viewed online at James Vincent, Watch Jordan Peele Use AI to Make 
Barrack Obama Deliver a PSA About Fake News, (Apr. 7, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/tldr/2018/4/17/17247334/ai-fake-news-video-barack-obama-
jordan-peele-buzzfeed [https://perma.cc/89UY-GFFB]. 
54 Justus Thies et al, Face2Face: Real-time Face Capture and Reenactment of RGB Videos, 
UNIVERSITY OF ERLANGEN-NUREMBERG 1, 1-2 (2016) 
http://www.graphics.stanford.edu/~niessner/papers/2016/1facetoface/thies2016face.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S662-UQ3E]. 
55 Matthew Gault, After 20 Minutes of Listening, New Adobe Tool Can Make You Say 
Anything, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 5, 2016), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/jpgkxp/after-20-minutes-of-listening-new-
adobe-tool-can-make-you-say-anything [https://perma.cc/SA5A-TVYM]. 
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pulse from a video clip of a real person,56 and in some faked video, a 
human pulse will not be present. 
So the arms race between creators and detectors of fake videos will 
continue—the next iteration of technologies to create fake video clips 
of humans may simulate pulses in its images. But the fundamental 
dynamic is likely to be one of reaction—creators of fakes will have the 
advantage over detectors of fakes for some period of time, during 
which users of fakes will have the advantage. 
Perhaps a larger point is that an indicator or warning that a clip is 
fake may not actually be useful. For example, in early March 2017, 
Facebook began to display a tag on news items identified by a 
substantial number of users as “fake”; the tag indicated that the item 
contained disputed content.57 In late March 2017, the Guardian 
reported on many complaints about the tag from parties that 
forwarded a particular news item about the repeatedly debunked Irish 
slave trade.58 In November 2017, Fortune reported that a number of 
third-party fact checkers for Facebook were concerned that their work 
was doing little to curb fake news on the platform.59 A 2017 report 
from Stanford found that about 70 percent of Facebook users were 
unaware of Facebook’s new tool for reporting false news, and 90 
percent had not used the tool,60 even though the tool had been 
available and publicized to some extent for several months. If these 
reports are true, they suggest that for some substantial fraction of 
56 Guha Balakrishnan, Fredo Durand, & John Guttag, Detecting Pulse from Head Motions 
in Video, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY, 3430, 3436 (2013), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6619284/ [https://perma.cc/6VUB-HWR]. 
57 Hudson Hongo, Facebook Finally Rolls Out ‘Disputed News’ Tag Everyone Will Dispute, 
GIZMODO (March 3, 2017), https://gizmodo.com/facebook-finally-rolls-out-disputed-
news-tag-everyone-w-1792959827 [https://perma.cc/LY64-GR88]. 
58 Elle Hunt, ‘Disputed by Multiple Fact-checkers’: Facebook rolls out new alert to combat 
fake news, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2017, 8:37 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/22/facebook-fact-checking-tool-
fake-news [http://perma.cc/4JHV-5XVC]. 
59 Tom Huddleston Jr., Facebook’s Fact-Checkers Complain That ‘Fake Information Is 
Still Going Viral’, FORTUNE (Nov. 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/11/14/facebook-fact-
checking-fake-news/ [http://perma.cc/77LU-VR9B]. 
60 Russell Feingold et al., Fake News and Misinformation: The Roles of the Nation's 
Digital Newsstands, Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Reddit, STANFORD LAW SCHOOL LAW 
& POLICY LAB 45 (2017), https://law.stanford.edu/publications/fake-news-and-
misinformation-the-roles-of-the-nations-digital-newsstands-facebook-google-twitter-and-
reddit/ [https://perma.cc/2UTY-J2D6]. 
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viewers, it simply does not matter if the content of the news posting is 
disputed.  
Falsified video and audio present an even harder problem to solve. 
Textual inputs are processed in the first instance by System 2, which is 
itself oriented towards the symbolic and logical. Video and audio 
inputs are processed by System 1—and are hence even more likely to 
stimulate strong emotion regardless of whether warnings about 
authenticity are present. Indeed, it is well known that exposure to 
time-ordered sequences of images and sounds can provoke strong 
emotional reactions in certain people—otherwise known as 
moviegoers. 
Filmmaker Alfred Hitchcock is quoted as saying to scriptwriter 
Ernest Lehman that:  
[T]he audience is like a giant organ that you and I are 
playing. At one moment we play this note on them and 
get this reaction, and then we play that chord and they 
react that way. And someday we won’t even have to 
make a movie – there’ll be electrodes planted in their 
brains, as we’ll just press different buttons and they’ll 
go ‘oooh’ and ‘aaah’ and we’ll frighten them and make 
them laugh. Won’t that be wonderful?61  
One could not ask for a better description of the filmmaker’s 
intent. 
Neurological evidence supports the claim that some movies are 
quite capable of evoking strong emotional reactions in many people.62 
61 PAUL ELLIOTT, HITCHCOCK AND THE CINEMA OF SENSATIONS: EMBODIED FILM THEORY AND 
CINEMATIC RECEPTION 99 (2011). 
62 Specifically, inter-subject correlation (ISC) analysis depends on the use of functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to identify regions of the brain that are activated over 
the time period during which a subject views a film, thus yielding a specific sequence of 
brain regions “lighting up” as a function of time that is personal to the particular subject 
involved.  A second subject viewing the same film will have another sequence that is 
personal to the second subject, and so on.  When the sequences for different individuals are 
similar (i.e., highly correlated), the film is said to have high ISC because the film evokes 
activity in mostly the same areas of the brain in different individuals.  Films with low ISC 
evoke idiosyncratic responses that vary significantly with the individual.  It is an empirical 
result that some motion pictures have high ISC and others have low ISC (a canonical 
example might be a video taken of a street corner over a long period of time with no 
changes in perspective or magnification).  In other words, films with high ISC can reliably 
evoke particular sequences of brain response.  Activity in certain areas of the brain is 
known to correlate with various kinds of brain function, including different emotions, and 
thus it is reasonable to suppose that when the appropriate brain regions light up, the 
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A viewer knows he or she is watching a film with paid actors following 
a script written by human beings that generally includes many things 
that did not happen in reality, and still the viewer cries at various 
poignant moments during the film’s showing. Another example is a 
well done horror film—no amount of prior intellectual or cognitive 
knowledge about the nature of the film will eliminate the emotional 
power of the horror scenes. 
Today, filmmakers have a wide variety of tools at their disposal to 
practice their craft, including compelling screenplays, powerful music, 
appropriate lighting and scene editing, close-ups, and so on, but their 
cinematic choices are made intuitively. Neurocinematics offers the 
possibility that decisions made to induce specific emotions in the 
viewer could be made on a much more reliable and repeatable basis—
quite a boon for future IW/IO operators. Coupling neurocinematically 
informed filmmaking with falsified video and audio footage suggests 
that future deep-fake videos will make today’s propaganda seem quite 
amateurish by comparison. 
IV. ORGANIZING THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO DEAL WITH INFORMATION 
WARFARE AND INFLUENCE OPERATIONS 
The preceding Section III is profoundly important in 
understanding how the U.S. government is (or as will be seen, is not) 
organized to defend against cyber-enabled information warfare and 
influence operations. In particular, the concerns raised in Section III 
all relate to different kinds of speech, a term that is quite broad in the 
context of U.S. law, the Constitution, and the structure of U.S. 
governmental institutions. 
A. On the First Amendment—Some Constitutional Constraints on 
Government Action
Under current First Amendment jurisprudence and decades of 
precedent,63 it is virtually certain that any government regulation 
                                                                                                                  
viewer’s emotions are being engaged.  For more discussion on ISC, see Uri Hasson et al., 
Neurocinematics: The Neuroscience of Film, 2.1 PROJECTIONS 1 (2008), 
http://www.cns.nyu.edu/~nava/MyPubs/Hasson-etal_NeuroCinematics2008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GAK-4MVK]. 
63 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (“the Court has never endorsed the 
categorical rule . . . that false statements receive no First Amendment protection”); Meese 
v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 466, 480-83 (1987) (the Court is critical of a “paternalistic 
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directed at intentionally false, misleading, or polarizing speech would 
have to be drafted quite narrowly and with exceptional precision to 
avoid running afoul of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court will 
uphold content-based speech restrictions only if narrowly tailored to 
combat what the Court deems to be a compelling government interest. 
The relevant legal hurdles are likely all the more insuperable because 
much of the communication that forms the basis of cyber-enabled 
information warfare and influence operations is political speech--a 
form of expression that elicits the Supreme Court's greatest solicitude.  
Given that the concerns raised in Section III relate to different 
kinds of speech, they necessarily implicate the U.S. Constitution and 
especially the First Amendment, which places strong restrictions on 
the authority of government to restrict the content of speech. Any 
content-based government restrictions on speech are subject to a 
standard of strict scrutiny and are allowable only in support of 
compelling governmental interests and then only with the narrowest 
means possible so that only “bad” speech is restricted and “bad” is 
narrowly defined. Furthermore, a long history of Supreme Court 
decisions has held that political speech is among the most protected of 
all categories of speech.  
One metaphor frequently used to describe the operation of the 
First Amendment is the marketplace of ideas. This metaphor posits 
that the value of a specific idea is determined in competition with 
other ideas rather than by the judgment of an external authority (such 
as government), and the judgments that people make in weighing 
these various ideas against each other determine which ones survive. 
Truth emerges through public debate and discourse of ideas, 
uninhibited by governmental interference. 
The “marketplace of ideas” metaphor, however, is potentially 
misleading in today’s information environment and the presence of 
cyber-enabled IW/IO.64 In the marketplace of ideas, good ideas push 
out bad ideas. The philosophy underlying the First Amendment was 
                                                                                                                  
assumption that the public will misunderstand” the use of the term “political propaganda” 
and therefore will “misuse [that] information”).  
64 Tim Wu has also explored this question, arguing that “it is no longer speech itself that is 
scarce, but the attention of listeners,” an assertion that, if true, undercuts the basis on 
which the First Amendment was originally written and adopted.  See Tim Wu, Is the First 
Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, 
(Sept. 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete 
[https://perma.cc/34LK-8TXE]. 
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developed by John Stuart Mill65 at a time in human history when 
information available to the public was sparser by many orders of 
magnitude than it is today. The metaphor also implicitly assumes that 
information consumers have access to all of the ideas and information 
that must be compared, although it stretches the imagination to 
believe that is true in today’s marketplace of ideas.  
But — continuing the metaphor — markets sometimes experience 
market failure for various reasons, at which point governments often 
step in to remediate those failures. Furthermore, the discussion in 
Section III suggests that the metaphor does not apply in today’s 
information environment and in the presence of cyber-enabled 
IW/IO.66 Thus, the important question that arises is this: to the extent 
that there is market failure today in the marketplace of ideas, how 
should the U.S. government respond? 
A fundamental question of today is whether the cyber-enabled 
proliferation of false, misleading, and inauthentic statements designed 
to manipulate and distort the political process is so pervasive and so 
destructive that the nation should consider ways to prohibit such 
speech—while at the same time minimizing the dangers of either 
government abuse or undue restrictions on the marketplace of ideas. 
Even more problematic from a First Amendment standpoint are 
statements that are literally true but nevertheless misleading.67 
And what of divisive ideas and opinions? To the extent that the 
political ideas and thoughts spread through cyber-enabled IW/IO are 
regarded as speech (and how could they not be?), any governmental 
restraints on that speech would be even more inherently suspect.  
The First Amendment has also been used to ensure the rights of 
Americans to receive information from a diversity of sources, and in 
65 Jᴏʜɴ Sᴛᴜᴀʀᴛ Mɪʟʟ, ON LIBERTY 86 (David Bromwich & George Kateb, Vail-Ballou Press 
2003) (1859).  
66 For more on this issue, see Wu, supra, note 65 (arguing that “it is no longer speech itself 
that is scarce, but the attention of listeners,” an assertion that, if true, undercuts the basis 
on which the First Amendment was originally written and adopted).   
67 The following old story illustrates that sometimes the best way to lie is to tell the truth.  A 
merchant ship docks in a new harbor.  On the first night, the first mate goes ashore and 
returns drunk.  The next morning, the captain enters into the ship’s log: “The first mate 
returned drunk last night.” The first mate pleads with the captain: “Captain, please don’t 
let that stay in the log. This could keep me from getting a promotion.” The captain says: “It 
is true that you returned drunk last night, and if it is true it has to go in the log. That’s the 
rule.”  The next night, the captain goes ashore and returns sober.  The first mate enters into 
the log: “The captain returned sober last night.” 
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particular from foreign sources. For example, in considering the 
Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962 (which 
required the Postmaster General to collect and deliver unsealed 
communist propaganda only upon the recipient’s request), the U.S. 
Supreme Court held unanimously that “[t]he regime of this Act is at 
war with the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate and 
discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment.“68 Of 
particular note is the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan in this 
case in which he writes that, “[T]he dissemination of ideas can 
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to 
receive and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas 
that had only sellers and no buyers.”69 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
also held (again, unanimously) that, “[T]he Constitution protects the 
right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, 
and to be generally free from governmental intrusions into one's 
privacy and control of one's thoughts.”70  
In light of these precedents, it is interesting to contemplate its 
applicability to U.S. government efforts to suppress foreign actors 
from introducing information in American public discourse. For 
example, if a substantial number of American citizens want to receive 
ads and videos from Russian troll farms, could the U.S. government 
constitutionally take action to against those troll farms to prevent 
them from sending such material into the United States? Even today, 
Defense Department planners are required to take extra care in 
operations that might result in misinforming the American public. 
The discussion of Sections I-III strongly suggests that cyber-
enabled IW/IO, as it has been practiced recently against the United 
States, is specifically intended to cause market failure in the U.S. 
marketplace of ideas. At the same time, the discussion of this section 
(Section IV-A) makes it clear that the First Amendment places 
significant limitations on direct U.S. government action to impede the 
flow of information from practitioners of cyber-enabled IW/IO to the 
United States.  
Therefore, for the sake of analysis, this paper hypothesizes that 
there exist some indirect and thus constitutionally permissible 
68 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (quoting in part N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
69 Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
70 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 557 (1969). 
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strategies for combating IW/IO--strategies focusing, for example, on 
preventing unlawful foreign intervention in U.S. elections or in 
equipping U.S. audiences to be more cognizant of IW strategies and 
resistant to their influence. Assuming such strategies exist, it remains 
to be considered whether government has the expertise, knowledge, 
technical capabilities, and resources to act effectively and wisely in 
designing and implementing those strategies. 
B. U.S. Government Departments and Agencies with Some Possible 
Role in Addressing Adversary Information Warfare and Influence 
Operations
Given a host of other precedents regarding government regulation 
on the content of political speech, it is highly unlikely (arguably near-
impossible) that any governmental restrictions on the content of 
political speech would stand up to scrutiny. Nevertheless, for the sake 
of argument, imagine that constitutional objections could be 
addressed successfully. In this hypothetical world, the government 
would be free to act—but would it have the expertise, knowledge, 
technical capabilities, and resources to act effectively and wisely?  
The U.S. Government consists of fifteen departments (i.e., the 
executive departments of the executive branch) and a large number of 
agencies not affiliated with any department, each of which has 
different authorities for action and different expertise to support the 
exercise of those authorities.71 What follows below is a listing of U.S. 
71 The names and missions of U.S. government executive branch departments can be found 
at USA.gov; as of this writing, fifteen departments are listed. Executive Departments, 
USA.GOV, (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) https://www.usa.gov/executive-departments 
[https://perma.cc/S4CT-QC3S]. As for U.S. government agencies not affiliated with any 
department, the term “independent agency” is not sufficiently well-defined for analytical 
purposes.  The Administrative Conference of the United States notes that there is no widely 
accepted definition of that term, noting that some scholars use the term to mean “any 
agency created outside the EOP [Executive Office of the President] or executive 
departments,” while other scholars use the term to denote agencies whose leaders can only 
be removed “for cause,” “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office,” or similar 
language. DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 48-49 (1st ed. 2012), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook%202012%20FINAL_M
ay%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/HKE8-2K9S]. As the ACUS notes, “independence in 
this context means independence from political interference, particularly removal by the 
President.” Id. This paper has used an operational definition of the universe of agencies to 
be considered—the entities listed in the 2012 ACUS report as “independent agencies” as 
well as those listed on USA.gov as “independent agencies.” Id. at 52-54, 56, Independent 
Agencies, USA.GOV, (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) https://www.usa.gov/independent-
agencies [https://perma.cc/8AVC-HPZK]. 
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government departments and agencies whose mission and roles, in 
this author’s assessment, have some possible relevance to addressing 
information warfare and/or influence operations conducted against 
the United States. (Italicized material below refers to the part of the 
department or agency’s authorities/mission/expertise that may be 
relevant.) 
 
● The Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a 
well-articulated doctrine and framework for psychological 
operations—how to use psychological operations against 
adversaries and how to respond to psychological operations 
conducted by adversaries.72 (The Department of Defense has 
flipped repeatedly between “psychological operations” and 
“military information support operations” as the appropriate 
title for activities covered under this rubric.)  
● The Department of Education. Under the rubric of the 
Department of Education’s mission to promote student 
achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by 
fostering educational excellence, the Department of Education 
has from time to time supported efforts to promote critical 
thinking in schools.73  
● The Department of Justice. The Department of Justice 
prosecutes criminal activity. In February 2018, the 
Department of Justice indicted 13 Russian nationals and three 
Russian companies in connection with alleged interference 
with the 2016 campaign.74 Specifically, the indictment charged 
the defendants with one count of conspiracy “to defraud the 
United States by impairing, obstructing, and defeating the 
lawful functions of the Federal Election Commission, the U.S. 
Department of Justice, and the U.S. Department of State in 
administering federal requirements for disclosure of foreign 
72 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13: Psychological Operations, FED’N OF AM. 
SCIENTISTS (2010) https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-13-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RRY9-
S5B7]. 
73 See P. Karen Murphy et al., Quality Talk: Developing Students' Discourse to Promote 
Critical-Analytic Thinking, Epistemic Cognition, and High-Level Comprehension, INST. OF 
EDUC. SCI. (2013). 
74 Indictment ¶¶ 2-3, United States v. Internet Research Agency, No. 1:18-cr-00032-DLF 
(D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2018) https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download 
[https://perma.cc/Q7Y8-28D2]. 
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involvement in certain domestic activities” and one count of 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud by violating 
18 USC Sections 1343 and 1344.75 
● The Department of State. Within the Department of State, the 
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs has 
the mission of supporting the achievement of U.S. foreign 
policy goals and objectives, advancing national interests, and 
enhancing national security by informing and influencing 
foreign publics and by expanding and strengthening the 
relationship between the people and Government of the 
United States and citizens of the rest of the world. The Under 
Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs oversees the 
Bureau of Public Affairs(PA), the Bureau of International 
Information Programs (IIP), and the Global Engagement 
Center (GEC),76 each of which with some expertise in some 
aspect of information warfare or influence operations. 
o The IIP supports people-to-people conversations with 
foreign publics on U.S. policy priorities, developing 
multimedia communications products for both traditional 
communications and new media channels and managing 
an overseas network of bricks-and-mortar American 
Spaces.77  
o PA engages in strategic and tactical communications 
planning to advance America’s foreign policy interests, 
uses social media and other modern technologies to 
engage the public, and oversees the State Department's six 
international Regional Media Hubs, which are overseas 
platforms for engagement of foreign audiences via the 
internet and broadcast and print media.78 
o The GEC’s role is to “lead, synchronize, and coordinate 
efforts of the Federal Government to recognize, 
understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-
75 Id. 
76 Under Secretary for Pub. Dipl. and Pub. Aff., STATE.GOV, (last visited Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/r/index.htm [https://perma.cc/C5R8-J3U3].  
77 Bureau of Int’l Info. Programs, STATE.GOV. (last visited Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/r/iip/ [https://perma.cc/MC8L-AGHG].  
78 Bureau of Pub. Aff., STATE.GOV. (last visited Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ 
[https://perma.cc/JT3G-BFLC].  
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state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at 
undermining United States national security interests.”79 
In this role, it seeks to increase the reach and effectiveness 
of U.S. government communications, to identify 
efficiencies and opportunities in the messaging and 
partnership space, to drive a wedge between audiences that 
are most vulnerable to harmful propaganda and hostile 
nations, groups, and terrorists seeking to influence them, 
and to inject factual content about terrorist organizations 
into the information space to counter recruitment and 
radicalization to violence. 
● The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG). The BBG’s 
mission is to inform, engage, and connect people around the 
world in support of freedom and democracy.80 The BBG 
oversees a number of international broadcast networks, 
including Voice of America; Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty; Office of Cuba Broadcasting (including Radio and 
Television Martí and martinoticias.com); Radio Free Asia; and 
Middle East Broadcasting Networks (including Alhurra 
Television, Radio Sawa and MBN Digital). These networks 
strive to provide programming that provides accurate, 
objective, and comprehensive news, especially in regions in 
which freedom of the press is limited, nonexistent, or not fully 
established. 
● The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In 1976, the Senate 
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With 
Respect To Intelligence Activities reported that “The CIA 
currently maintains a network of several hundred foreign 
individuals around the world who provide intelligence for the 
CIA and at times attempt to influence opinion through the use 
of covert propaganda. These individuals provide the CIA with 
direct access to a large number of newspapers and periodicals, 
scores of press services and news agencies, radio and television 
stations, commercial book publishers, and other foreign media 
outlets.”81 If similar activities continue today, they are likely 
79 Global Engagement Center, STATE.GOV (last visited Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/r/gec/index.htm [https://perma.cc/PXK4-T2JE].  
80 Who We Are: Mission, BBG.GOV. (last visited October 3, 2018), 
https://www.bbg.gov/who-we-are/mission/ [https://perma.cc/SHJ5-PCEH].  
81 S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 455 (1976). 
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performed under authorities granted to the President under 50 
USC § 3093 (Presidential approval and reporting of covert 
actions). 
● The Federal Communications Commission (FCC): The role of 
the FCC is to promote connectivity and ensure a robust and 
competitive market in communications services such as cable, 
radio, television, satellite and wire. The FCC is not permitted 
to promulgate regulations that infringe upon constitutionally 
protected free speech, even if such speech may be offensive to 
some parts of the public. On the other hand, when certain 
kinds of speech are not fully protected (e.g., when speech can 
constitutionally be restricted or banned, as in the cases of 
indecent/profane or obscene material respectively), the FCC 
can and does enforce regulations to implement such 
restrictions or prohibitions. 82 
● The Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC enforces 
federal campaign finance laws, which covers public disclosure 
of funds raised and spent to influence federal elections and 
restrictions on contributions and expenditures made to 
influence federal elections.83 For example, 52 USC § 30121 
makes it illegal for a foreign national, directly or indirectly, 
to make a contribution or donation of money or other thing of 
value in connection with a Federal election. 
● The Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC works to 
prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and unfair business practices, 
and provide information to help consumers spot, stop, and 
avoid scams and fraud.84 
● The Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID 
promotes and demonstrates democratic values abroad, and 
advances a free, peaceful, and prosperous world by providing 
international development and disaster assistance through 
partnerships and investments that save lives, reduce poverty, 
82 The FCC and Freedom of Speech, FCC.GOV. (last visited Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/fcc-and-freedom-speech 
[https://perma.cc/8XSN-LH58]. 
83 Mission and History, FEC.GOV. (last visited Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.fec.gov/about/mission-and-history/ [https://perma.cc/68YS-JFYU] . 
84 Federal Trade Commission, USA.GOV, (last visited Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.usa.gov/federal-agencies/federal-trade-commission 
[https://perma.cc/G8L7-LCWJ]. 
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strengthen democratic governance, and help people emerge 
from humanitarian crises and progress beyond assistance. 
● The Election Assistance Commission (EAC).85 The Help 
America Vote Act of 2002 requires states to implement 
procedures for provisional voting, for providing voting 
information, for updating and upgrading voting equipment, 
implementing and maintaining statewide voter registration 
databases, for implementing voter identification procedures, 
and for managing procedures for administrative complaint. 
The EAC assists states in meeting these requirements, and 
under this rubric, it maintains guidelines for electronic voting 
systems, operates the federal government's voting system 
certification program, and administers a national 
clearinghouse on elections that includes shared practices, 
information for voters and other resources to improve 
elections. 
● The National Science Foundation (NSF).86 NSF is a federal 
agency created "to promote the progress of science; to advance 
the national health, prosperity, and welfare; to secure the 
national defense..." Through grants and contracts, NSF 
supports basic research in all fields of fundamental science and 
engineering, except for medical sciences.87 
● The National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH).88 NEH 
promotes excellence in the humanities and conveying the 
lessons of history to all Americans by awarding grants in the 
humanities, which include, but are not limited to, the study 
and interpretation of “language, both modern and classical; 
linguistics; literature; history; jurisprudence; philosophy; 
archaeology; comparative religion; ethics; the history, criticism 
and theory of the arts; those aspects of social sciences which 
have humanistic content and employ humanistic methods; and 
the study and application of the humanities to the human 
85 Help America Vote Act, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N. (last visited Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.eac.gov/about/help-america-vote-act [https://perma.cc/99PM-Y728]. 
86 About the National Science Foundation, NSF.GOV. (last visited Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nsf.gov/about [https://perma.cc/L4JU-Z9Y6]. 
87 Id. 
88 About the National Endowment for the Humanities, NEH.GOV. (last visited Jan. 23, 
2019), https://www.neh.gov/about [http://perma.cc/76VF-27TK]. 
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environment with particular attention to reflecting our diverse 
heritage, traditions, and history and to the relevance of the 
humanities to the current conditions of national life.” 
● The Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS).89 The 
IMLS mission supports America’s museums, libraries, and 
related organizations through grantmaking, research, and 
policy development; these activities promote literacy and 
lifelong learning and increase access to information, ideas, and 
networks through libraries and museums. 
C. The Bad Fit of U.S. Government Authorities for Addressing 
Adversary Information Warfare and Influence Operations
The brief survey of Executive Branch departments and agencies 
suggests that a variety of U.S. government entities have some 
expertise that could be relevant to some aspects of the cyber-enabled 
information warfare/influence operations problem. But, in most 
cases, the fit between the italicized authorities/mission/expertise and 
the cyber-enabled IW/IO conducted by adversaries in the United 
States is not good. 
 
● The entity within the Department of Defense responsible for 
homeland defense is the U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM), which provides command and control for 
Department of Defense homeland defense efforts and 
coordinates defense support of civil authorities. According to 
USNORTHCOM’s web page,90 USNORTHCOM is responsible 
for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime 
warning for the continental United States (and Alaska and 
Canada as well). Its civil support mission includes domestic 
disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, 
floods and earthquakes, as well as counter-drug operations 
and managing the consequences of a terrorist event using 
weapons of mass destruction. Note the absence of any mention 
of combatting adversary propaganda—USNORTHCOM’s 
military mission is to protect the homeland against physical 
89 Mission, IMLS.GOV. (last visited Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.imls.gov/about-us 
[http://perma.cc/8H8L-E3YQ]. 
90 About US Northern Command, NORTHCOM.MIL. (last visited Jan. 23, 2019), 
http://www.northcom.mil/About-USNORTHCOM/ [http://perma.cc/DN2B-JVHR]. 
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attack, and its civil support mission is limited to responding to 
domestic disasters. More generally, 18 U.S.C. 1385 (also known 
as the Posse Comitatus Act) restricts the circumstances under 
which the Department of Defense can take action and the 
activities it can conduct within the United States.91 
● Although the Department of Education has supported efforts 
to promote critical thinking in schools, education in the United 
States is primarily a state and local responsibility. The federal 
government is not responsible for developing the required 
curricula or determining requirements for enrollment and 
graduation. Thus, to the extent that instilling critical thinking 
habits enable citizens to better identify disinformation and 
fake news more effectively,92 imparting those skills broadly to 
citizens in the course of their formal educational programs will 
not be a federal responsibility. Also, calls for the improvement 
of critical thinking in citizens have been common for at least a 
half-century,93 and the same laments about the lack of critical 
thinking are seen today—a reality suggesting that the 
promotion of critical thinking skills in the population is at best 
a problem solved over a time scale measured in decades if not 
centuries. 
● The Justice Department indictments of February 2018 focused 
on conspiracy related to the nondisclosure of foreign 
involvement in certain domestic activities regarding U.S. 
91 For the view of the Department of Defense on the restrictions imposed by the Posse 
Comitatus Act, see U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD MANUAL 3025.01, VOL. 3, DEFENSE 
SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: PRE-PLANNED DOD SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES, SPECIAL EVENTS, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, AND OTHER NON-DOD ENTITIES 
(2016), 
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/302501_vol03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P92H-M3HB].  According to this document, the DOD can provide 
support to civilian law enforcement agencies, to the U.S. Secret Service, and for counter-
drug operations, and nothing in principle would rule out the DOD from cooperating with 
civilian agencies, at their request, when the latter would find it useful to apply DOD 
knowledge and expertise on psychological operations and how they might be countered. 
92 See, International Baccalaureate, In a Fake News Climate, Critical Thinking Skills Are 
More Crucial Than Ever, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2017), 
https://www.chronicle.com/paid-article/in-a-fake-news-climate-critic/36 
[https://perma.cc/DX62-BL8Y].  
93 Raymond B. Fox, Difficulties in Developing Skill in Critical Thinking, 55 J. EDUC. RES. 
335, 335 (1962). 
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elections in 2016.94 But under U.S. law, individuals, 
corporations, and unions are allowed to spend unlimited 
amounts of money on political messaging, as long as they 
operate independently of specific political campaigns.95 Thus, 
it appears that if the activities alleged in the Justice 
Department indictment had been undertaken by U.S. citizens 
properly registered as agents of foreign principals—and funded 
through mechanisms allowed by U.S. law—no U.S. laws would 
have been violated. 
● The State Department’s activities to advance U.S. foreign 
policy interests through people-to-people interactions and 
various strategic and tactical communications activities target 
foreign audiences and are not a defense against cyber-enabled 
IW/IO carried out against U.S. citizens.96 The activities of the 
GEC have only recently turned to disinformation efforts 
conducted by nation-states, and most of these activities focus 
on audiences outside the United States, relying on “fact-based 
narratives and analyses to counter adversarial foreign 
propaganda and disinformation directed at the United States 
94 Indictment, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 3-5. 
95 On individuals, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1976) (“The First Amendment 
requires the invalidation of the Act's independent expenditure ceiling, its limitation on a 
candidate's expenditures from his own personal funds, and its ceilings on over-all 
campaign expenditures, since those provisions place substantial and direct restrictions on 
the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political 
expression, restrictions that the First Amendment cannot tolerate.”).  The Act to which 
Buckley refers is the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in 1974, which 
limited expenditures by individuals or groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate" to 
$1,000 per candidate per election. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-443, §101 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431). On corporations, see 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (“[W]ealthy 
individuals and unincorporated associations can spend unlimited amounts on independent 
expenditures.  Yet certain disfavored associations of citizens—those that have taken on the 
corporate form—are penalized for engaging in the same political speech. . . When 
Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to command where a 
person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it 
uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the 
freedom to think for ourselves.”).  
96 I note without further comment that as positive and enlightened as these Department 
activities are from a U.S. perspective, one has to wonder how the governments of those 
audiences targeted by these activities feel about such communications. 
34 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 15:1-2 
and United States allies and partner nations.”97 However, one 
important focus of GEC activities calls for proposals to 
“identify, catalogue and, where feasible, quantify current and 
emerging trends in adversarial foreign propaganda and 
disinformation in order to coordinate and shape the 
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures to expose 
and refute foreign disinformation.”98 This focus is directly on 
point but assumes the consumers of foreign disinformation 
actually care about being properly informed. 
● As with the State Department, the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors operates outside U.S. territory. Its programming 
activities do not focus on U.S. citizens and cannot be a defense 
against cyber-enabled IW/IO carried out against U.S. citizens. 
● The CIA has substantial expertise in propaganda and 
psychological operations, and could provide advice to other 
U.S. government agencies, but it is not permitted to conduct 
operations in the United States. Moreover, according to 50 
U.S.C 3093, covert action undertaken by the U.S. government 
must not involve any action that would violate the U.S. 
Constitution.99 Additionally, it appears that Russian efforts to 
interfere with the U.S. political system, including the 2016 
election, started as early as 2014.100 If true, this suggests a 
possible intelligence failure—that the CIA, and the U.S. 
intelligence community more broadly, either did not know 
about the election threat the Russians posed for two years, or it 
did know and failed to disseminate information about that 
threat throughout the U.S. government. 
● The ability of the FCC to restrict certain kinds of speech is 
limited today to “broadcast media.” The Communications Act 
of 1934 establishes the FCC’s authority to manage the use of 
97 BUREAU OF PUB. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Request for Statements of Interest and 
Capacity (SOIC) Countering State-Sponsored Propaganda and Disinformation, 
GRANT.GOV (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-
opportunity.html?oppId=301460 [https://perma.cc/KMD7-NKV8]. 
98 Id. 
99 50 U.S.C. § 3093 (2015). In practice, this requirement shapes the scope and nature of 
U.S. propaganda because of concerns that such propaganda might reach and thus 
improperly influence U.S. persons.  
100 Indictment, supra note 74, at ¶ 3.   
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the relevant portion of the electromagnetic spectrum, which 
broadcast media—by definition—uses. But the FCC lacks 
authority to interfere with speech—constitutionally protected 
or not—in any other kind of media and, in particular, on the 
Internet. As noted above, political speech receives the highest 
levels of constitutional protection. 
● Federal campaign finance laws, enforced by the FEC, are for 
the most part intended to increase the transparency of political 
advertising. For example, on March 26, 2018, the FEC issued a 
notice of proposed rule-making that would require political 
advertising on internet-enabled devices and applications to 
disclose the sources that funded such advertising.101 The notice 
also noted the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens 
United that “identification of the source of advertising may be 
required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be 
able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being 
subjected.”102 However, the proposed rule rests on several 
assumptions: that issue advertising (i.e., advertising that is not 
explicitly tied to a specific political campaign or party) is 
comparatively less important than political advertising, that 
citizens actually do care about who is funding a political 
advertisement, and that the identity disclosure requirements 
cannot easily be circumvented. 
● The FTC’s authority to prevent fraudulent, deceptive, and 
unfair business practices, and to provide information to help 
consumers spot, stop, and avoid scams and fraud have been 
limited to transactions in which consumers exchange money 
with a real or alleged goods or service provider. This almost 
certainly does not extend to election practices in which citizens 
do not lose money. 
● USAID only acts abroad, and thus has no authority or 
responsibility for domestic action. 
● The Election Assistance Commission provides assistance to 
states for election administration—an activity that includes 
101 Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of ‘‘Public Communication”, 83 
Fed. Reg. 12864 (proposed Mar. 26, 2018) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100-110) 
(proposing a disclaimer regarding the identity of the payor or sponsor of “public 
communications on the internet that contain express advocacy, solicit contributions, or are 
made by political committees,” colloquially referred to as “political advertising”). 
102 Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 588 U.S. 310, 368 (2010). 
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building and securing HAVA-mandated state voter registration 
databases and certifying the security of computer-based 
electronic voting machines. But, as noted in Section II, 
cybersecurity threats (such as these) are distinct from cyber-
enabled IW/IO threats. 
● The National Science Foundation, the National Endowment 
for the Humanities, and the Institute of Museum and Library 
Services carry out their missions primarily through grant-
making activities. They do not have significant operational 
responsibilities regardless of the expertise that any of their 
staff may have as a result of those activities. 
 
More broadly, this brief survey of departmental and agency 
authorities also suggests two high-level observations. First, the legal 
authorities of U.S. governmental departments and agencies have yet 
to catch up to the problem of cyber-enabled IW/IO conducted against 
the United States. Indeed, U.S. governmental authorities that may be 
useful, continue to be premised on the existence of a marketplace of 
ideas that works well to inform a public that routinely and 
systematically engages in critical thinking and reflection on political 
matters. Even in an Internet-enabled information environment 
manipulated by sophisticated nation-state adversaries. 
Second and perhaps more importantly, given the diffuse nature of 
the cyber-enabled IW/IO problem, it is not clear at all how the U.S. 
government could draw a “bubble chart”—that is, a chart depicting the 
organizational units sharing a common objective—with unambiguous 
lines of responsibility and authority. Who or what existing entity could 
be put “in charge” or respond to cyber-enabled IW/IO? If, as seems 
likely, no existing entity could do the job, what charge should be given 
to a new entity to address the problem? 
To appreciate the complexity of the problem posed by cyber-
enabled IW/IO, it is helpful to consider two other examples. One 
example is provided in Figure 1, which presents what is colloquially 
known in the U.S. government as the cybersecurity “bubble chart.” It 
is intended to describe where within the U.S. government 
responsibility lies for different aspects of cybersecurity. Officials from 
the Obama Administration say that the chart was revised between 50 
and 100 times before a consensus on its content was achieved. 
The key feature of the cyber bubble chart is the spaces between the 
three bubbles, which refer to the Departments of Defense, Homeland 
Security, and Justice (FBI). With anything more than one bubble, 
there are necessarily gray areas in between them. These gray areas 
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show that some responsibilities are unclear and that information flow 
will be impeded in possible operational scenarios. Put differently, the 
bubble chart clearly shows three distinct bubbles, with zero overlap 
between them. A footnote to the bubble chart explains why: “Nothing 
in this chart alters existing DHS, DOJ, and DOD roles, 
responsibilities, or authorities.” Also, deliberations over the bubble 
chart for cybersecurity were conducted in the context of an accepted 
U.S. government definition of cybersecurity articulated in NSPD-54. 
If it was difficult to reach consensus on an area as well specified as 
cybersecurity, imagine the difficulties in determining responsibilities 
for a threat as diffuse such as that posed by information warfare and 
influence operations. 
A second example is from the early 1950’s, when the U.S. 
government became aware of a national security threat through 
electromagnetic warfare which was “the contest through preclusive 
use, jamming, interference and related measures for the control of all 
or parts of the radio spectrum or the denial of its use by others” and 
having a “direct bearing on diplomacy, limited or total military 
operations, economic warfare, psychological warfare and 
telecommunications policy.103 According to an archive-based study by 
Jonathan Winkler,104 “Attempts to address these problems [i.e., the 
problems posed by electromagnetic warfare] required a level of 
interaction between the military, diplomatic, and intelligence 
communities for which they were not prepared and that only the NSC 
could oversee. Even then, the matter was so complex that even the 
senior officials themselves acknowledged that it required presidential 
intervention and the emplacement of a technical advisor at the 
president’s side.”105  
103 Briefing Notes, “Soviet Capability for Waging Electromagnetic Warfare,” February 11, 
1953, CIA-RDP80R01443R000100220012-5, CIA CREST database (hereafter CIA CREST), 
National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter USNA); Appendix 2, NSC 137, 
cited in Appendix II, Jackson Report (Report of President’s Committee on International 
Information Activities), June 30, 1953, Special Collection, “Intelligence, Policy and Politics: 
The DCI, the White House, and Congress,” doc. 5166d49399326091c6a60500, CIA FOIA 
Electronic Reading Room, 111-13.   
104 Jonathan Winkler, The Forgotten Menace of Electro-Magnetic Warfare in the Early 
Cold War, 42(2) DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 254, 254-280 (2018), 
https://academic.oup.com/dh/article-abstract/42/2/254/3896229 
[https://perma.cc/M3GH-8D63]. 
105 Id. at 278.  
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Although the Eisenhower administration was able to address the 
problem in the short run by building additional communications 
facilities for the Department of Defense, “the complex interconnected 
issues identified at the time by the participants about synthesizing 
federal defense requirements with civilian capabilities, making more 
efficient use of the radio spectrum, and balancing the desire for 
efficiency against the traditions of antimonopoly and plurality proved 
insurmountable.”106 Moreover, “It was not possible to agree on 
whether there should be someone in the cabinet who would handle the 
problem of electromagnetic warfare and who that person should be. . . 
. Neither the Truman nor Eisenhower administrations could figure out 
how best to balance these weights in the absence of clear authority for 
dealing with the dual-use technology in war, peace, or somewhere in 
between such as the Cold War.”107 
Winkler further writes that “in 1953, NSC officials lamented that 
‘the relative importance of this whole field of activity’ was not clear. 
They were unsure ‘whether a new agency is required, a new PSB-type 
Board, a new bureau in an old-line department like Commerce, or a 
staff in the Executive Office of the President. The Bureau [of the 
Budget] apparently needs guidance as to whether it might be raising a 
technical function too high, or not raising an extremely important 
function high enough.’”108 
To this author, the organizational parallels between the U.S. 
government trying to respond to the threat of electromagnetic warfare 
and trying to respond to cyber-enabled IW/IO are striking. 
V. CONCLUSION
In 1927, Justice Louis Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Whitney v. 
California stated that: 109 
[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear 
and present, unless the incidence of the evil 
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 279. 
108 Id.  
109 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).  
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there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time 
to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, 
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced 
silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. 
This extended passage is often summarized as “the cure for bad 
speech is more speech.” But, the information environment has 
changed greatly since 1927. Justice Brandeis’ conclusion relies on 
citizens having the “opportunity for full discussion” and time to “avert 
the evil by the processes of education.”110 Given the vastly increased 
volume and velocity of information today, and cyber-enabled 
information warfare and influence operations exploiting these 
characteristics of the environment, both opportunity and time are in 
short supply. 
As argued above, the likelihood of governmental action against the 
cyber-enabled proliferation of false, misleading, or inauthentic 
statements designed to manipulate and distort the political process is 
exceedingly low under current interpretations of the First 
Amendment. But, constitutional interpretations sometimes slowly 
change in response to changes in circumstance and environment. This 
author will not go further than to make two points. First, the advent of 
cyber-enabled speech of various kinds poses a significant and 
qualitatively different environment that may warrant such change in 
the future. Second, the wisdom of allowing government agencies to 
make decisions about what counts as “a false, misleading, or 
inauthentic statement designed to manipulate and distort the political 
process” can legitimately be questioned. 
It is clearly good that some degree of public attention has been 
focused on the problems posed by cyber-enabled IW/IO conducted 
against the United States. But, as serious as foreign election 
interference is to the nation’s future, the real threat to the republic is 
the tribal and toxic nature of current political discourse. Such tensions 
have been rising for some time, and yet their enormous amplification 
through cyber-enabled IW/IO has been shocking to many observers. 
Moreover, current U.S. law does not forbid any of the activities that 
may be characterized as cyber-enabled IW/IO. In fact, First 
Amendment jurisprudence protects many of these activities explicitly. 
110 Id. at 377. 
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Given the limitations on the governmental action described above, 
action to ameliorate the problem by the private sector is a possible 
alternative. Indeed, the private sector in the United States owns and 
operates technological infrastructure that provides the cyber-enabling 
part of cyber-enabled IW/IO. And the First Amendment does not 
place constraints on private sector action—a point misunderstood by 
many citizens. 
This paper does not address possible private sector actions, except 
to make the following point: the First Amendment would severely 
limit the influence that the U.S. government could exercise with 
respect to entities in the private sector. That is, government law, 
regulation, or policy to influence private sector actions would also be 
subject to court challenge if those actions impeded the free expression 
of ideas and opinions. However, if private sector entities were willing 
to take such actions on their own (e.g., because they decided to do so 
as part of a different business model, as a matter of corporate ethics, 
or as a part of incentives that the U.S. government might offer), they 
would be entirely free to do so.111 
In this new environment, perhaps a new social contract is needed 
between citizens and government regarding the extent and nature of 
the rights afforded by the First Amendment—which was adopted more 
than two centuries before the invention of the World Wide Web. 
Perhaps the private sector will find business models that enable them 
to profit from more civil and reasoned discourse. Perhaps researchers 
will find effective ways to depolarize political dialogue.  These 
elements may—or may not—have a place in a serious strategy for how 
to deal with the problems posed by cyber-enabled IW/IO. Whatever 
that strategy entails, the design of such a strategy is a necessary 
prerequisite for any serious discussion of how the U.S. government 
should be structured to address these problems. 
It may be possible to find a national consensus about awareness of 
the dangers posed by cyber-enabled information warfare and 
influence operations—obviously a necessary first step. But even with 
good leadership addressing the issue—focused on the problem, 
consistent in its approach (whatever it may be), and committed to the 
idea of reality-based policy discourse—organizing the various assets of 
the U.S. government and the private sector—a whole-of-nation 
111 Facebook Suspends U.S. Conspiracy Theorist Alex Jones, REUTERS (July 27, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-infowars/facebook-suspends-u-s-
conspiracy-theorist-alex-jones-idUSKBN1KH2PN [https://perma.cc/V4WH-E9A8]. 
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response rather than a whole-of-government response—to handle 
such a diverse threat would be a difficult if not daunting task. If 
national leaders deny the existence of the problem—or benefit from 
it—making meaningful progress will be much, much more difficult. 
I have argued that the information marketplace metaphor fails in 
the information environment, and specifically in the face of a foreign 
cyber-enabled information IW/IO threat that further undermines the 
operation of that market. Thus, we will need to examine what kind of 
coordinated national response is possible that would not threaten the 
values that underlie the First Amendment. We have our work cut out 
for us. 
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Table 1. System 1 and System 2 thinking, compared
System 1 System 2
Unconscious Reasoning Conscious Reasoning
Implicit Explicit
Automatic Controlled
Low Effort High Effort
Large Capacity Small Capacity
Rapid Slow
Default Process Inhibitory
Associative Rule-Based
Contextualized Abstract
Domain Specific Domain General
Evolutionarily Old Evolutionarily Recent
Nonverbal Linked to language
Includes recognition, perception, 
orientation
Includes rule following, comparisons, 
weighing of options
Modular Cognition Fluid Intelligence
Independent of working memory Limited by working memory capacity
Non-Logical Logical
Parallel Serial
Source: DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 1st ed. 2011).  
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Figure 1. Bubble Chart for U.S. Government Cybersecurity Roles and 
Responsibilities
 
